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PROPERTY RULES FOR MARTIAN RESOURCES:
HOW THE SPACE ACT OF 2015 INCREASES
THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SINGLE ENTITY
CONTROLLING ACCESS TO MARS
TYLER CONTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR DECADES, scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs havededicated their lives to expanding humankind’s permanent
presence beyond Earth for the purposes of technological pro-
gress, promoting human cooperation, and avoiding our inevita-
ble extinction if we remain on our home planet indefinitely.
The leaders of today’s private aerospace companies that intend
to establish permanent settlements on the Moon or Mars are
carrying on the mission of avoiding the extinction of our spe-
cies, as first described by planetary scientists as early as the
1970s.1 In order to fund this dramatic undertaking, the most
prominent aerospace companies are pursuing strategies built
upon monetizing the literally infinite natural resources of our
solar system and beyond.2
One of the greatest difficulties associated with establishing
permanent human settlements on other celestial bodies is the
* The author is an Associate at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP in
Houston, Texas. He primarily works on corporate transactions for companies in
the oil and gas and renewable energy industries. He graduated from Duke
University School of Law, where he served as an Articles Editor on Law and
Contemporary Problems, and the University of Florida, where he graduated with
degrees in Astronomy and Economics. He would like to thank Professor Joseph
Blocher for his guidance in developing this Article and Professor Kate Bartlett for
her dedication to teaching and her ability to show her students what strenuous
legal analysis feels like.
1 See generally JOHN S. LEWIS, MINING THE SKY: UNTOLD RICHES FROM THE ASTER-
OIDS, COMETS, AND PLANETS (1996); GERARD K. O’NEILL, THE HIGH FRONTIER:
HUMAN COLONIES IN SPACE (1977).
2 See, e.g., Neel V. Patel, SpaceX’s Bold Plan to Generate Fuel on Mars, INVERSE
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/21492-spacex-methane-pro
duction-mars [https://perma.cc/XXT5-GLRC].
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dramatic cost of launching and landing a payload capable of
supporting such settlements under the harsh conditions of an
uninhabited planet or moon. A promising proposal for limiting
mission costs related to establishing a permanent human settle-
ment on Mars—which has been discussed by companies such as
SpaceX, Boeing, and Blue Origin, as well as nations such as the
United States and the United Arab Emirates—would be collect-
ing water and carbon dioxide on Mars.3 Water exists on Mars in
large, contiguous bodies at the planet’s polar ice caps. Carbon
dioxide exists in the planet’s atmosphere and at its ice caps.4
Water and carbon dioxide can be chemically converted into
rocket propellant or used as water, carbon dioxide, and oxygen
for life support and industrial purposes.5 Any amount of these
valuable resources that can be produced on Mars rather than
launched from Earth would significantly decrease the cost of the
mission and assist in developing a self-sustaining civilization on
the planet and on other bodies throughout the solar system.6
In November 2015, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Com-
petitiveness Act (commonly known as the SPACE Act) became
federal law.7 For private aerospace companies, particularly those
with the goal of eventually using or supplying resources ob-
tained in outer space, the most promising element of the law is
the creation of a property right in space resources for U.S. per-
sons who obtain such resources.8 This property right was heavily
3 See id.; Abigail Beall, NASA Is Working Out How to Create Rocket Fuel on Mars,
WIRED (July 18, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/nasa-rocket-fuel-mars
[https://perma.cc/HWP8-KGFD]; Alan Boyle, Blue Origin Gets in on NASA Studies
for Resource Utilization on Moon and Mars, GEEKWIRE (May 31, 2018), https://
www.geekwire.com/2018/blue-origin-gets-nasa-studies-resource-utilization-moon-
mars/ [https://perma.cc/RME2-BDWB]; Dom Galeon, UAE Announces Plans to
Have a Human Colony on Mars by 2117, FUTURISM (Feb. 15, 2017), https://futur
ism.com/4-mars-2117-project-the-uae-joins-the-race-for-the-red-planet [https://
perma.cc/PUM5-HJST].
4 David Darling, Polar Caps of Mars, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCI., http://
www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/M/Marspoles.html [https://perma.cc/P7
E4-EQZL] (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
5 See David B. F. Portree, Making Rocket Fuel on Mars (1978), WIRED (Nov. 3,
2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/11/making-rocket-fuel-on-mars-1978/
[https://perma.cc/9AR5-XCGL].
6 See, e.g., Beall, supra note 3.
7 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA), Pub. L. No.
114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
8 See id. § 402, 129 Stat. at 721 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303 (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
This Article will refer to section 402 of the CSLCA as the SPACE Act. Title VI of
the CSLCA, where section 402 is located, is technically denoted by the short title
“Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015.” Id. § 401. However,
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lobbied for by the budding asteroid mining industry, which
plans to recover and sell resources found on the asteroids in the
inner solar system.9 For the first time, a national government
has incentivized its citizens to pursue the rich resources of outer
space by granting them full title to any resources they take pos-
session of.10
While the SPACE Act’s creation of a property right in space
resources presents interesting international law issues involving
the United States’ adherence to the requirements of the Outer
Space Treaty and other Soviet-era treaties,11 this Article focuses
on whether the incentives created by the SPACE Act could moti-
vate the first resource-producing entity on Mars to obtain a sig-
nificant portion—or potentially all—of the water and carbon
dioxide on Mars before a viable competitor could establish it-
self. The establishment of a dominant producer of natural re-
sources on Mars would allow such producer to charge monopoly
prices to second comers whose missions would require the con-
sumption of water and carbon dioxide acquired on the Martian
surface or, alternatively and perhaps more importantly, to price
any competitor out of this market.
If this scenario were to play out, the hypothetical firstcomer
could effectively control access to the planet through the prices
it charges to other entities that attempt to establish permanent
settlements on the planet and that do not have feasible, alterna-
tive sources of water and carbon dioxide.12 In a worst-case scena-
this Article will refer to section 402 as the SPACE Act, as much of the literature
about the law colloquially refers to the entire public law as the SPACE Act.
9 See, e.g., K.G. Orphanides, American Companies Could Soon Mine Asteroids for
Profit, WIRED (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/how-to-mine-as
teroids-for-fun-and-profit [https://perma.cc/AL9B-XG6M].
10 Luxembourg also passed a similar law within a few months that aligned with
the United States’ SPACE Act, and it invested C= 25 million for an equity stake in
Planetary Resources, an American asteroid mining startup. David Schrieberg, As-




11 See P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploration of Resources in
Outer Space, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 160, 161–62 (2016); John Myers, Extraterrestrial
Property Rights: Utilizing the Resources of the Final Frontier, 18 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 77,
90–91 (2016).
12 This Article assumes that, for the foreseeable future, there will not be an
adequate alternative supply of water or carbon dioxide to Mars from elsewhere in
outer space (for example, via asteroid mining) that could compete with the
firstcomer’s production of these resources on Mars. At the time this Article was
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rio, the firstcomer could refuse to sell to second comers for any
competitive, political, or other conceivable reason, thereby shut-
ting off second comers from these critical resources. A private
company exercising singular control over access to resources on
Mars, and therefore to the planet itself, would be an unintended
result of the SPACE Act, unlikely to be supported in the future.
This Article explores alternative methods of allocating resources
on Mars that would allow the firstcomer to reap a substantial
return on its investment from being the first to settle the planet
without preventing subsequent entities from competing.
While this Article suggests qualifying the SPACE Act’s prop-
erty rule by adding a new Martian Riparian Rights Rule, its pur-
pose is not to propose the optimal regulatory system for the
allocation of resources on Mars. Rather, its goal is to draw atten-
tion to the potentially harmful incentives created by the current
rule and to spark a discussion on a method of appropriation
that better protects the benefits of Mars for all humankind.
Such a result would better serve the pro-competitive purpose of
the SPACE Act and ensure that Earth’s governments do not en-
able a private entity to unilaterally control access to the benefits
of the most substantial property expansion in human history.
In Part II, this Article discusses the motivations for expanding
humankind’s presence beyond Earth, selecting Mars as a desti-
nation, and the means for making the mission economically via-
ble. Part III analyzes the provisions of the SPACE Act that
establish the property right in space resources and the incen-
tives created by its standard of appropriation. In Part IV, this
Article explains how these incentives would encourage the de-
velopment of a monopoly in this nascent industry and how the
persistence of a monopoly could allow a company to effectively
control access to Mars if left unregulated. Finally, Part V suggests
potential alternative systems for allocating resources in space, as
opposed to the property right created by the SPACE Act. It set-
tles on the Martian Riparian Rights Rule, under which qualifica-
tions would be added to the property right established under
the SPACE Act that impose objectively determinable limitations
on the amount of resources a single entity can extract from a
large celestial body, such as Mars.
written, no company or nation has announced a Mars settlement plan that relies
on the supply of resources to Mars via asteroid mining, and no asteroid mining
companies have announced plans to transport recovered asteroid resources to
Mars.
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II. WHY HUMANS SHOULD GO TO MARS AND HOW TO
MAKE IT ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE
Since the 1970s, leading planetary scientists and space activ-
ists, such as Gerard K. O’Neill and John S. Lewis, have argued
for pursuing the economic development and human coloniza-
tion of space.13 O’Neill and Lewis posit that the only way to en-
sure the indefinite survival of the human species is to leave our
home planet, Earth, and form alternative, permanent habitats in
outer space.14 Whether by nuclear war, climate change, over-
population, uncontrollable disease, or an existential threat, such
as an apocalyptic asteroid impact, humans are almost certain to
reach the point of extinction before increases in the Sun’s tem-
perature over the next 1.5 billion years render human life unsus-
tainable on Earth.15
The desire to avoid humanity’s inevitable extinction on Earth
is the evolutionary stimulus that has motivated thousands of for-
ward-thinking engineers, entrepreneurs, academics, and policy
makers to seek to establish a permanent human presence in
space outside of low earth orbit. While the potential for eco-
nomic return is significant, this biologically worthy goal has
been the primary motivation for the leaders of private aerospace
companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, Planetary Resources,
and others.16 For example, Elon Musk, in a speech at the 2016
International Astronautical Congress, expressed how his desire
to avoid humanity’s extinction and open up the riches of space
is the sole driver behind all of his entrepreneurial endeavors.17
This part first discusses the cost difficulties associated with
traditional launch systems when applied to a Mars mission.
Then, some methods to overcome these difficulties are sug-
13 See LEWIS, supra note 1; O’NEILL, supra note 1.
14 LEWIS, supra note 1; O’NEILL, supra note 1.
15 See Ethan Siegel, The Four Ways the Earth Will Actually End, FORBES (Sept. 27,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2017/09/27/the-four-
ways-the-earth-will-actually-end/#235f746b4f0f [https://perma.cc/DY8X-DBV7];
see also LEWIS, supra note 1; O’NEILL, supra note 1; J.F. Kasting, Runaway and Moist
Greenhouse Atmospheres and the Evolution of Earth and Venus, 74 ICARUS 472, 488
(1988).
16 See, e.g., Kate Wheeling, Outer Space Treaties Didn’t Anticipate the Privatization of
Space Travel. Can They be Enforced?, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 14, 2019), https://
psmag.com/social-justice/outer-space-treaties-didnt-anticipate-the-privatization-
of-space-travel-can-they-be-enforced [https://perma.cc/7DH6-3VM8].
17 Elon Musk, Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species, 5 NEW SPACE 46, 57
(2017) (summarizing Musk’s presentation at the 67th International Astronautical
Congress, September 26-30, 2016).
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gested, with a focus on taking advantage of the abundant natu-
ral resources already present on Mars.
A. THE PROBLEM WITH ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT PRESENCE
ON MARS: COST
Space travel is expensive. NASA’s Saturn V rocket of the late
1960s, which carried the Apollo astronauts to the Moon, cost
about $1.23 billion (in 2016 dollars) per launch.18 One of the
primary factors underlying the dramatically high cost of mis-
sions to the Moon and Mars is the need to reach 25,020 miles
per hour, Earth’s escape velocity,19 while carrying a heavy
payload that would include life support supplies and propellant
for the return journey.
In order to make the cost of a Mars mission economically fea-
sible, it is imperative that any launch system carry as little
payload as possible. Since an object’s acceleration is inversely
proportional to its mass, the lower the mass of the launch sys-
tem, the more efficiently (in terms of propellant usage) it will
accelerate to Earth’s escape velocity.20 Limiting the total mass of
the launch vehicle directly decreases a mission’s cost by lowering
development and construction costs, particularly those associ-
ated with handling higher propellant volumes.
The most important difference between establishing a perma-
nent presence on Mars and the Apollo missions is that the Mars
mission will require carrying a much larger payload than
needed for travelling to the Moon for a few days.21 The first
Mars settlers will have to bring everything they need to survive
on an unforgiving, isolated planet for an indeterminate amount
of time—potentially the rest of their lives—with almost no hope
18 Matt Williams, Falcon Heavy vs. Saturn V, UNIVERSE TODAY (July 25, 2016),
https://www.universetoday.com/129989/saturn-v-vs-falcon-heavy/ [https://
perma.cc/QH9Q-JR9G]; see also T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECI-
SION 48 (1999).
19 See, e.g., Matt Williams, The Challenges of an Alien Spaceflight Program: Escaping
Super Earths and Red Dwarf Stars, UNIVERSE TODAY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://
www.universetoday.com/139052/the-challenges-of-an-alien-spaceflight-program-
escaping-super-earths-and-red-dwarf-stars/ [https://perma.cc/RT3A-3LTK]. Es-
cape velocity is the velocity at which an object must travel in order to escape the
gravitational force of a celestial body. See id.
20 See Rocket Principles, NASA, https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/rocket/TR-
CRocket/rocket_principles.html [https://perma.cc/NK9F-HGPS] (last updated
June 12, 2014). The text assumes a constant force produced by the rocket’s
engines.
21 Musk, supra note 17, at 46–47, 50.
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of a rescue mission if disaster were to occur once they have set-
tled there.22 The Mars settlers will have to bring systems for
waste disposal, energy generation, and protection from harmful
solar particles.23 They will need, at least initially, supplies of
food, oxygen, and water.24 And, if they plan on being able to
return to Earth, they will need to bring a propellant supply for
relaunch and the return journey.25 If these or any other neces-
sary items can be produced on Mars rather than launched from
Earth, the cost of the endeavor would be decreased
significantly.26
B. GATHERING WATER AND CARBON DIOXIDE ON MARS,
RATHER THAN BRINGING THESE RESOURCES FROM
EARTH, WOULD DRAMATICALLY REDUCE
MISSION COSTS
Water and carbon dioxide exist in vast quantities in easily ac-
cessible, contiguous bodies at the Martian surface.27 These two
resources are the keys for opening Mars up to human settle-
ment. Water can be consumed by humans in its liquid form.
Molecular oxygen can be chemically extracted from water or
carbon dioxide for breathing by humans on Mars.28 Carbon di-
oxide can be used to support newly introduced plants’ efforts at
photosynthesis on Mars.29 Perhaps most importantly, combina-
tions of rocket propellant can be extracted from these com-
pounds in sufficient quantities to fuel return journeys to Earth
22 See O. Glenn Smith & Paul D. Spudis, Mars for Only $1.5 Trillion, SPACENEWS
(Mar. 8, 2015), https://spacenews.com/op-ed-mars-for-only-1-5-trillion/ [https:/
/perma.cc/N7QS-6HKB].
23 See, e.g., Irene Klotz, Boiling Blood and Radiation: 5 Ways Mars Can Kill,
SPACE.COM (May 11, 2017), https://www.space.com/36800-five-ways-to-die-on-
mars.html [https://perma.cc/66D9-ZDV9]; Ellis Talton & Remington Tonar, Re-
source Utilization on Mars Could Be the Model of Efficiency and Sustainability, FORBES
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellistalton/2018/09/17/re
source-utilization-on-mars-could-be-the-model-of-efficiency-and-sustainability/#25
647d0f5617 [https://perma.cc/L52J-BA42].
24 See Talton & Tonar, supra note 23.
25 See Musk, supra note 17, at 49.
26 See id.
27 See Jeffrey J. Plaut et al., Subsurface Radar Sounding of the South Polar Layered
Deposits of Mars, 316 SCI. MAG. 92, 92, 94 (2007); see also Michael H. Carr & James
W. Head III, Oceans on Mars: An Assessment of the Observational Evidence and Possible
Fate, 108 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 1, 24 (2003).
28 See Talton & Tonar, supra note 23.
29 Kirsi M. Lehto et al., Suitability of Different Photosynthetic Organisms for an Extra-
terrestrial Biological Life Support System, 157 RES. MICROBIOLOGY 69, 70 (2006).
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or expeditions deeper into the solar system.30 If water and car-
bon dioxide can be gathered on Mars and utilized for these vital
purposes rather than launched from Earth, the decreased
payload would help decrease the cost of the mission to the point
of rendering its financing attainable.31
Water on Mars can primarily be found at the planet’s polar
ice caps in solid form.32 There are a combined 3.2 million cubic
kilometers of ice in thick, contiguous sheets at the northern and
southern polar ice caps.33 There is also evidence of ice at more
temperate latitudes just beneath the top layer of Martian soil.34
The total amount of ice on Mars is close to 5 million cubic kilo-
meters.35 Water on Mars that is extracted will not replenish
through any natural processes, so the quantity of water, while
significant, is inherently limited.36 The following image from the
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter shows Mars’s northern polar ice
cap, which is primarily comprised of ice.37
30 See, e.g., Musk, supra note 17, at 49.
31 Id. Systems also exist for recycling human urine into water and carbon diox-
ide into oxygen. See Beall, supra note 3; Erika Engelhaupt, How Urine Will Get Us to
Mars, SCI. NEWS (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/gory-details
/how-urine-will-get-us-mars [https://perma.cc/E5R5-JPQC]. While the first set-
tlers would surely bring these systems with them, the cost of future missions could
be reduced if those missions do not have to carry additional urine and carbon
dioxide recycling systems with them as the population on Mars grows. See Beall,
supra note 3.
32 Carr & Head, supra note 27, at 1; Plaut et al., supra note 27, at 92.
33 See The Red Planet in 3D, NASA (May 27, 1999), https://www.nasa.gov/audi
ence/foreducators/informal/features/F_Red_Planet.html [https://perma.cc/
7KSK-MC26] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
34 See Lujendra Ojha et al., Spectral Evidence for Hydrated Salts in Recurring Slope
Lineae on Mars, 8 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 829, 832 (2015).
35 See Magdalena Osumi, Architect Pair Tap 3-D Printing, Ice to Share Top NASA




36 Lawrence H. Kuznetz, Last Place to Boil Away, First Place to Look: The Hunt for
Water and Life on Mars, 19 GRAVITATIONAL & SPACE BIOLOGY 85, 85–86 (2006).
37 Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, NASA (May 26, 2010), https://www.nasa.gov/
mission_pages/MRO/multimedia/pia13163.html [https://perma.cc/GL3H-TA
BX].
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Carbon dioxide, on the other hand, makes up over 95% of
Mars’s thin atmosphere.38 There are about 25 trillion metric
tons of carbon dioxide on Mars.39 During the northern hemi-
sphere’s winter, the polar ice cap is in complete darkness, and
gaseous carbon dioxide in the atmosphere condenses into solid
carbon dioxide (commonly known as dry ice), which settles into
a one-meter-thick layer over the water ice that makes up the ma-
jority of the ice cap.40 The southern polar ice cap has an eight-
meter-thick layer of dry ice over its sheet of ice that does not
completely disappear during summer.41 Therefore, carbon diox-
ide on Mars is as nearly as accessible as nitrogen and oxygen are
on Earth. As mentioned above, up to 25% of the carbon dioxide
on Mars can be found in solid form as dry ice at the polar ice




40 See Darling, supra note 4; Nola Taylor Redd, Mars’ Thick Dry Ice Sheet Points to
Planet’s Wetter Past, SPACE.COM (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.space.com/11456-
mars-dry-ice-liquid-water.html [https://perma.cc/E4QH-82JG].
41 See Darling, supra note 4.
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caps,42 immediately adjacent to the primary sources of water on
the planet. Carbon dioxide on Mars, like water, will not be re-
plenished by any natural processes, so its supply is also limited.43
It is worth emphasizing just how accessible these resources are
from the Martian surface. Water, which exists in solid form at
the polar ice caps, can be “mined” from Mars’s surface.44 For
comparison, “mining” water on Mars would be similar to gather-
ing water from Antarctica, a giant sheet of ice. Carbon dioxide
can be removed from the atmosphere similarly to how animals
on Earth take oxygen out of the air with every breath. Addition-
ally, solid carbon dioxide exists at the northern ice cap during
winter,45 which can be gathered from the same locations as ice.
Following collection, water (H2O) and carbon dioxide (CO2)
can be converted into two common combinations of rocket pro-
pellant: (1) liquid oxygen (O2) and liquid hydrogen (H2); and
(2) liquid oxygen (O2) and liquid methane (CH4).46 These mol-
ecules can be produced from water and carbon dioxide via elec-
trolysis and the Sabatier process, simple chemical reactions that
rely on energy produced by solar arrays constructed on the Mar-
tian surface, which also provide energy for other life support
systems.47 If the spaceship used to fly to Mars runs on one of
these combinations, the spaceship’s propellant could be pro-
duced on Mars, which would alleviate the need to carry addi-
tional fuel for the return journey all the way from Earth.48
If the first Martian settlers successfully land and establish re-
source-gathering capabilities, a valuable industry will be born.
While the usefulness of water and oxygen for human life sup-
port is apparent, the true value of water and carbon dioxide on
Mars lies in their ability to be chemically rearranged into various
types of rocket propellant.49 If propellant for the return journey
42 Jerry Coffey, What Is Mars Atmosphere Made Of, UNIVERSE TODAY (Mar. 6,
2011), https://www.universetoday.com/84657/what-is-mars-atmosphere-made-
of/amp/ [https://perma.cc/A8ZJ-QERT].
43 See Deborah Williams-Hedges et al., Loss of Carbon in Martian Atmosphere Ex-
plained, NASA (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/jpl/msl/loss-of-
carbon-in-martian-atmosphere-explained [https://perma.cc/EUN3-ER7F].
44 See, e.g., Tanya Lewis, Incredible Technology: How to Mine Water on Mars,
SPACE.COM (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.space.com/24052-incredible-tech-min
ing-mars-water.html [https://perma.cc/5UMZ-2H99].
45 See Darling, supra note 4.
46 Musk, supra note 17, at 49, 49 tbl.4.
47 Id. at 56, 56 fig.16; Talton & Tonar, supra note 23.
48 See Musk, supra note 17, at 48 tbl.3.
49 See Talton & Tonar, supra note 23.
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or further expeditions into the solar system has to be brought
from Earth, the initial Mars settlement mission would likely
never proceed because the additional weight would render the
launch too costly and the remote potential for economic return
would make financing the mission improbable.50
In summary, for purposes of this Article, the following four
points are the most salient:
1. While there is enough water and carbon dioxide to supply
any inhabitants of Mars with the valuable resources de-
rived from these compounds far into the future, the
amounts of each of these resources are limited in the
sense that they will not replenish on their own.
2. Water and carbon dioxide primarily exist on Mars in con-
tiguous bodies. Ice is mainly found in two large ice sheets,
similar to Earth’s polar ice caps, and carbon dioxide is
freely associated in the planet’s atmosphere.
3. Water and carbon dioxide are the most valuable resources
on Mars for anyone who wishes to settle there. They can
be converted into two types of rocket propellant or used
for drinking, breathing, cooling, growing plants, or the
countless industrial processes that require these com-
pounds and their derivatives.
4. Any future settlers of Mars that are not associated with the
firstcomer will also need to use water and carbon dioxide
for the same purposes. These second comers could dra-
matically decrease the cost of their Mars mission if they
can procure these resources on Mars at a lower cost than
they would incur by bringing them from Earth.
III. THE SPACE ACT OF 2015: PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN THE PRIVATE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
BY INCENTIVIZING THE COLLECTION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES IN SPACE
The SPACE Act was signed into law by President Obama on
November 25, 2015.51 The SPACE Act’s long title announced its
purpose as “facilitat[ing] a pro-growth environment for the de-
veloping commercial space industry by encouraging private sec-
tor investment and creating more stable and predictable
50 See Musk, supra note 17, at 47–48.
51 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA), Pub. L. No.
114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
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regulatory conditions . . . .”52 The titles of the SPACE Act (the
Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneur-
ship Act, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act, and the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act)53
signal that Congress intended to promote competition among
private aerospace companies.
Of prime importance, the law created a new property right in
asteroid and space resources.54 Now, under U.S. law, any citizen
who obtains non-biological resources from an asteroid or, more
broadly, anywhere in outer space gains title to those resources.55
This right is similar to the rule of capture in oil and gas explora-
tion and production56 or the rule regarding possession of wild
animals from the classic property case Pierson v. Post.57
The SPACE Act was heavily lobbied for by the three leaders in
the asteroid mining industry at the time: Planetary Resources,
Deep Space Industries, and Bigelow Resources.58 Industry com-
mentators hailed the law as a boon to the asteroid mining indus-
try, with little focus on the SPACE Act’s application to and
effects on the market for resources on Mars.59
This part analyzes the property right created by the SPACE
Act and goes on to explain how the incentives created by this
right promote the development of a monopoly producer of nat-
ural resources on Mars.
A. THE SPACE ACT ESTABLISHES A PROPERTY RIGHT IN
SPACE RESOURCES
The SPACE Act reads: “A United States citizen engaged in
commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource
. . . shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource
obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the
asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with
52 Id.
53 Id. § 1.
54 Id. § 402 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303 (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900).
57 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 175–76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
58 See Matthew Shaer, The Miner’s Guide to the Galaxy, FOREIGN POL’Y, May–June
2016, at 44, 49–50.
59 See Sarah Fecht, Senate Votes to Legalize Space Mining, POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 11,
2015), https://www.popsci.com/congress-votes-to-legalize-asteroid-mining
[https://perma.cc/J962-P83U]; Richard Yonck, The Dawn of the Space Mining Age,
SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Nov. 24, 2015), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/
guest-blog/the-dawn-of-the-space-mining-age/ [https://perma.cc/4ZGL-T3A4].
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applicable law . . . .”60 The SPACE Act defines an asteroid re-
source as “a space resource found on or within a single aster-
oid,” and it defines a space resource as “an abiotic resource in
situ in outer space.”61 Abiotic means “of or characterized by the
absence of life or living organisms,”62 and in situ means “situ-
ated in the original, natural, or existing place or position.”63 As-
teroids are any “rocky object,” other than planets or moons, “in
space that can be a few feet wide to several hundred miles
wide.”64
A “space resource” therefore includes any non-biological re-
source found in its original or natural place anywhere in outer
space.65 This definition is not limited regarding location in
outer space, so it applies to resources found on or in asteroids,
moons, planets, stars, or any celestial body around stars or in
other galaxies.
B. THE SPACE ACT INCENTIVIZES THE OVERPRODUCTION OF
SPACE RESOURCES, WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE ENTRENCHMENT
OF A MARTIAN MONOPOLIST
By granting title to anyone who obtains space resources, the
SPACE Act creates a property right based on prior appropria-
tion that is analogous to the basic rule of capture from oil and
gas law66 or the rule from Pierson v. Post regarding taking title to
wild animals.67 These rules incentivize those with access to a
class of rival goods to acquire ownership of the goods at a
greater rate than necessary for current and reasonable future
consumption. However, in the cases of oil and gas production
and hunting, external limitations temper the potential for these
rules to allow a single producer to gain control over the markets
for these goods.68
60 CSLCA § 402 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303 (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
61 Id. (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51301(1)–(2) (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
62 Abiotic, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/abiotic
[https://perma.cc/CLD4-U7BV] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
63 In situ, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/in-situ
[https://perma.cc/9NM6-DJGT] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
64 Asteroid, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/diction
ary/Asteroid.html [https://perma.cc/J2EV-YEBQ] (last updated Aug. 7, 2017).
65 See CSLCA § 402 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51301(2) (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
66 See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900).
67 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
68 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244
(1968).
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The rule of capture states that the first person to capture or
obtain a natural resource, such as oil or gas, takes ownership of
that resource.69 The rule of capture evolved from situations
where adjacent producers were extracting oil or gas from a
shared underground reservoir that extended beneath each of
their adjacent properties.70
For example, if only 10% of a shared reservoir of oil exists
directly beneath the boundaries of Landowner A’s land, Land-
owner A may extract, and thereby take title to, 100% of the oil
in the reservoir, even though 90% of the reservoir sits beneath
Landowner B’s land.71 The rule of capture is thus an exception
to the Latin principle cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum,
meaning “[h]e who owns the soil owns everything above (and
below), from heaven (to hell).”72
Similarly, the classic property case Pierson v. Post dealt with a
situation in which a hunter had spent considerable effort track-
ing a fox on a public beach when a rival hunter interceded by
killing and carrying off the fox as his own.73 In deciding in favor
of the interceding hunter, the court held that a hunter does not
own a wild animal until he takes control of the animal by captur-
ing or mortally wounding it.74 The rule of capture and the rule
from Pierson are thus standards of determining ownership of a
resource based on prior appropriation.
Rules based upon prior appropriation create a property right
only when an individual takes control of the resource in ques-
tion.75 Under the rule of capture and Pierson, the eventual
owner is one from a group of actors who desires a currently un-
claimed resource. Prior appropriation incentivizes each individ-
ual to take control and ownership of the resource as quickly as
possible because the amount available to each individual de-
69 See Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 202.
70 See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 907–08 (2005).
71 See id. at 907.
72 See Herbert David Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est . . . Quousque Tandem, 26 J.
AIR L. & COM. 237, 238 (1959).
73 See, e.g., Kathryn Loncarich, Nature’s Law: The Evolutionary Origin of Property
Rights, 35 PACE L. REV. 580, 614 (2014).
74 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
75 See Nisha D. Noroian, Prior Appropriation, Agriculture and the West: Caught in a
Bad Romance, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 181, 192 (2011); see also Bryan Leonard & Gary D.
Libecap, Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the Development of Irriga-
tion in the Western United States 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22185, 2017).
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creases as others acquire ownership of a greater amount of the
resource.76 Such incentives often arise in regard to resources for
which public policy encourages the growth and development of
the affected industries.77
Most importantly, rules based on prior appropriation, such as
the rule of capture, do not contain inherent limitations on the
monopolization of the resource in question.78 If policy consider-
ations mediate against allowing a monopolist to develop in an
industry based upon determining legal ownership of property
through prior appropriation, other legal or practical limitations
must exist that prevent a monopoly from developing.
Legal rules impose limits on the potentially harmful effects of
the rule of capture and the rule from Pierson. An individual’s
ability to access oil and gas is limited because only those with
appropriate mineral rights have the right to extract oil and
gas.79 If a single entity attempted to secure the rights to extract
oil and gas from every reserve on Earth, they would have to ne-
gotiate among hundreds of governments and virtually infinite
private actors with insurmountable attendant transaction and
holdout costs. Similarly, since wild animals typically cross private
lands freely, entering another’s land to hunt would constitute a
trespass, which likewise prevents a single entity from hunting
every wild animal on Earth.
The incentive created by the SPACE Act’s property rule is
most similar to those involved with the rule of capture. For those
engaged in the commercial recovery of space resources, the only
barrier to owning resources is obtaining them.80 Therefore,
once an entity has access to space resources, it has a similar in-
centive to collect and store as much of these resources as possi-
ble in order to sell them to future buyers.81 The rule of capture
and the rule for hunting wild animals were developed when ex-
ternal limitations to the reach of these rules that encourage
76 See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, The Law of Prior Appropriation: Possible Lessons for
Hawaii, 25 NAT. RES. J. 911, 931 (1985).
77 See Noroian, supra note 75, at 182–83.
78 See Williams, supra note 76, at 925.
79 See generally Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on
World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT’L L.J. 13 (1989).
80 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA), Pub. L.
No. 114-90, § 402, 129 Stat. 704, 721 (2015) (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303 (Supp.⏐ 2016)).
81 See Rhett Larson, If There Is Water on Mars, Who Gets to Use It?, SLATE (Nov. 2,
2015), https://slate.com/technology/2015/11/the-tricky-question-of-water-
rights-on-mars.html [https://perma.cc/LBN9-BEAV].
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overproduction already existed, as discussed above. However,
the SPACE Act does not prohibit a single entity from taking
ownership of all of the resources on Mars or in any way limit the
amount of Martian resources that a single entity could obtain
and own.82 Therefore, there is a strong possibility that the first-
mover advantage in this market would be adequate to secure a
monopoly position moving forward in the absence of external
limitations that could otherwise prevent such a result from
occurring.83
IV. THE SPACE ACT’S PROPERTY RULE INCREASES THE
LIKELIHOOD OF A SINGLE ENTITY CONTROLLING
ACCESS TO MARS
The SPACE Act’s property rule incentivizes anyone with the
ability to obtain asteroid or space resources to do so at a rate
beyond their needs for consumption. This would limit the abil-
ity for future competition after the first producer has overcome
the extreme fixed costs of beginning resource production on a
large, resource-rich celestial body such as Mars. The SPACE Act,
which was passed with the purpose of promoting a pro-growth
environment for the aerospace industry, thus instituted a prop-
erty rule for asteroid and space resources that is potentially at
odds with its stated purpose.84
While it is desirable for any rule’s purpose and effect to align,
if there are not limitations on the reach of the SPACE Act’s
property right, the first-moving producer that overcomes the
high fixed cost of establishing resource production on Mars
could take a monopolistic position as the sole provider of re-
sources on the newly-settled planet. Success for the firstcomer
could prevent second comers from competing because they
would be unable to match the price offered by the firstcomer
who enjoys a significant supply advantage.85 This supply and
pricing advantage would increase the likelihood of the second
comer accepting the price offered by the monopolist rather
than undertaking its own production activities in the first place.
82 See CSLCA § 402.
83 See Larson, supra note 81.
84 See CSLCA § 402 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303 (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
85 See TIMOTHY TAYLOR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS ch. 9.1 (OpenStax
CNX ed., 2016), https://d3bxy9euw4e147.cloudfront.net/oscms-prodcms/medi
a/documents/Economics2e-OP_h3weDXv.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G23-BJG6].
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Allowing a monopoly over the provision of resources is not
necessarily a bad thing.86 However, when it comes to the initial
human settlement of Mars, there are policy reasons that mediate
against allowing a single private entity to control access to an
entire planet.
This part posits that there is a proper limiting factor that will
prevent the monopolization of asteroid resources, thereby align-
ing the SPACE Act’s purpose and effect in that instance; how-
ever, there is no such limiting factor when it comes to gathering
resources from a large, resource-rich celestial body, such as
water and carbon dioxide on Mars. Once a monopoly develops
on Mars, that entity could discriminate against potential custom-
ers that would rely on purchasing resources from the monopoly,
with the result of effectively controlling access to the Red Planet.
A. THE SPACE ACT’S PROPERTY RULE WILL NOT FACILITATE
THE MONOPOLIZATION OF THE PRODUCTION OF
ASTEROID RESOURCES
The SPACE Act’s property rule does not increase the likeli-
hood of a monopoly emerging in the asteroid mining industry in
the same fashion as in the Martian natural resource industry due
to the vast distances among the hundreds of millions of aster-
oids in our solar system. Recall from Part III that the SPACE
Act’s property rule was lobbied for most heavily by the asteroid
mining industry87 and that the SPACE Act differentiates be-
tween asteroid resources and space resources.88 A space re-
source is any non-biological resource found “in situ in outer
space,” while an asteroid resource is any “space resource is
found on . . . a single asteroid.”89
There are an estimated 150 million asteroids with a diameter
greater than 100 meters within the orbit of Jupiter.90 Jupiter’s
average orbital radius from the Sun is 779,000,000 kilometers.91
Assuming hypothetically that asteroids are evenly distributed,
86 See generally GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE POWER OF MONOPOLY: ITS MAKE-UP AND
ITS MENACE 6 (1928).
87 See Shaer, supra note 58.
88 See CSLCA § 402 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51301 (Supp. ⏐ 2016)).
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Jason Major, How Many Asteroids Are Out There?, UNIVERSE TODAY
(Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.universetoday.com/97571/how-many-asteroids-
are-out-there/ [https://perma.cc/AL9M-WCBQ].
91 See, e.g., Fraser Cain, How Far Is Jupiter from the Sun?, UNIVERSE TODAY (Nov. 9,
2009), https://www.universetoday.com/44615/distance-from-the-sun-to-jupiter/
[https://perma.cc/43CX-9WG6].
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each asteroid of this size would be, on average, about 3,000,000
kilometers away from the nearest asteroid of this class. This dis-
tance is about 9 times farther than the distance from Earth to
the Moon.92 These distances are difficult for any human to com-
prehend. However, they suggest that any single entity that plans
to capture a substantial portion of all asteroids in the inner solar
system would be significantly limited by the time it takes to travel
from a given human settlement to each asteroid, gather re-
sources, and return to the settlement, especially since asteroids
are not actually evenly distributed throughout the solar system.93
Going through the process of returning resources from a single
asteroid could take years.94 The amount of time it would take to
travel to every asteroid in the solar system and return resources
collected thereon to a human civilization is therefore difficult to
estimate.
The time cost imposed by the vast distances among the hun-
dreds of millions or billions of asteroids in the solar system pro-
vides an external limitation that prevents the incentives created
by the SPACE Act’s property rule from allowing a single entity to
control all of the asteroid resources in the solar system.95 This
practical limitation to the reach of the SPACE Act’s rule as ap-
plied to asteroid resources operates similarly to the legal limita-
tions attendant to the rule of capture and the rule from Pierson
v. Post. Since it is impracticable for a single entity to gather sub-
stantially all of the asteroid resources in the solar system within
any foreseeable period of time, there is little to no potential that
the first successful asteroid mining company will preclude
others from competing in the industry.
92 See Tim Sharp, How Far Is the Moon?, SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017), https://
www.space.com/18145-how-far-is-the-moon.html [https://perma.cc/JZE2-8495].
The average distance from the Earth to the Moon is about 380,000 kilometers. Id.
93 See Matt Williams, How Long Does It Take to Get to the Asteroid Belt?, UNIVERSE
TODAY (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.universetoday.com/130231/long-take-get-
asteroid-belt/ [https://perma.cc/X4YH-TQDB].
94 See id.
95 Cf. Ross Meyers, The Doctrine of Appropriation and Asteroid Mining: Incentivizing
the Private Exploration and Development of Outer Space, 17 OR. REV. INT’L L. 183, 199
(2015).
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B. THE SPACE ACT’S PROPERTY RULE COULD ALLOW THE
FIRST ENTITY TO ESTABLISH RESOURCE PRODUCTION ON MARS
TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL ACCESS TO THE PLANET AS ITS SOLE
PRODUCER OF CRITICAL RESOURCES
In contrast to the SPACE Act’s effects on the asteroid mining
industry, application of the law’s property rule to space re-
sources opens the door for the first entity to arrive at localized,
easily accessible resources to gain title to those resources with-
out the time limitations that would prevent the monopolization
of asteroid resources discussed above.96
The first entity to gather resources on Mars will have an incen-
tive to obtain as much carbon dioxide and water as quickly as
possible in order to gain title to these resources before a second
comer does. The firstcomer’s ownership of a meaningful per-
centage of the carbon dioxide and water on Mars could lead to a
single entity, likely an American company, effectively controlling
access to the entire planet by being the sole supplier of vital
resources to any second comer. The second comer would then
be forced to accept any price, up to the cost of producing the
water and carbon dioxide itself, and would have no alternative
supply if the firstcomer decided to cut it off from access to these
resources. The firstcomer could discriminate against or in favor
of captive buyers—who have no alternative source for these re-
sources—for any reason. This section reasons that the first suc-
cessful resource producer on Mars will likely establish itself as a
monopoly. It then argues that a monopoly resource producer
on Mars could effectively control access to the planet by discrim-
inating against potential customers and that such a result would
be deleterious to the purposes underlying the mission for con-
tinued human expansion into space.
1. The First Producer of Water and Carbon Dioxide on Mars Will
Likely Develop into a Monopoly
Monopolies generally develop in industries in which there are
large barriers to entry.97 While other factors can contribute to
the development of a monopolistic market, the resource pro-
duction market on Mars will be characterized by such dramati-
cally high fixed costs that it is difficult to imagine a competitor
establishing itself before a successful first producer has gathered
96 See supra part IV(A).
97 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 85, at ch. 9.1.
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enough resources to be able to price any future competitor out
of the market.98
Fixed costs include the amount of expenses a company must
incur before producing a single unit of whatever they are trying
to sell.99 The fixed costs of initiating water and carbon dioxide
gathering, chemical conversion, and storage capability on Mars
include the research and development necessary to design effec-
tive gathering, conversion, and storage systems, the cost of pro-
ducing these systems on Earth, the cost of transporting the
equipment, and the cost of installing it on the planet.100 Fixed
costs would also include providing adequate energy generation
capacity to power these systems. Success in funding this under-
taking, much less safely establishing a permanent presence on
Mars, will be very difficult for any private or government entity
to achieve.101
By being the first to establish this infrastructure in the face of
extreme cost and difficulty, the firstcomer would gain a natural
monopoly-like advantage in the industry, much like early elec-
tricity providers did in the United States around the turn of the
20th century.102 At that time, and to a lesser extent today due to
the deregulation of electricity markets, any firm that attempted
to compete had to succeed in bringing online competing elec-
trical power infrastructure—a relatively enormous fixed cost—
in the face of stiff competition from the small number of estab-
lished firms in the industry.103 When second comers to the in-
dustry attempted to compete, the firstcomer would simply lower
its prices below those that were economically feasible for the sec-
ond comer, who would then be unable to earn revenue to
recoup the fixed costs that it had incurred much more recently
than the firstcomer.104 As a result, electrical utilities are consid-
ered classic examples of “natural monopolies”—firms operating
in industries in which it is more economically efficient for the
98 See id. at ch. 9.2.
99 Id. at ch. 7.2.
100 See, e.g., Beall, supra note 3.
101 See Musk, supra note 17, at 56.
102 See, e.g., Matthew Lasar, How AT&T Conquered the 20th Century, WIRED
(Mar. 11, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2011/09/att-conquered-20th-century/
[https://perma.cc/YRL9-QT7B]; David Roberts, Power Utilities Are Built for the
20th Century. That’s Why They’re Failing in the 21st, VOX (Sept. 9, 2015), https://
www.vox.com/2015/9/9/9287719/utilities-monopoly [https://perma.cc/WY6V-
3RDN].
103 See Roberts, supra note 102.
104 See id.
2019] PROPERTY RULES FOR MARTIAN RESOURCES 207
established firm to invest in increasing its production capacity
and not competing on price with other firms than it is for com-
petitors to overcome the dramatic fixed costs and compete on
price with the established firm.105 A result of the persistence of a
natural monopoly is that it is able to set prices higher than
would generally prevail in a more competitive market.106
Under the SPACE Act’s property rule, there is a high likeli-
hood that the first firm to establish resource production activi-
ties on Mars would enjoy similar advantages as natural
monopolies have in the United States. Similar to utilities, the
Martian monopolist could set the price for water, carbon diox-
ide, oxygen, and rocket propellant at higher prices than would
prevail in a competitive market. Additionally, since the monopo-
list would have no competitors, it could manipulate its prices
without affecting its market share. If the monopolist raises the
price of its production above the profit-maximizing point, the
firm does not suddenly start losing market share to a competi-
tor. Rather, the monopolist simply sells a lower quantity and
thereby makes a smaller profit in exchange for whatever non-
economic purposes it values more than it values maximizing
profits.107
Compare the early Martian natural resource industry with the
retail gasoline industry, which is characterized by a high degree
of competition.108 As there is no meaningful difference in the
quality of gasoline available for purchase and there are a high
number of accessible suppliers, customers are likely to respond
to even the smallest price increase by finding a competing sup-
plier that is otherwise less convenient for the customer.109 This
renders gasoline retailers “price-takers,” which means that the
price they set is determined by macroeconomic forces outside of
an individual producer’s control.110 The result is a highly com-
105 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 85, at ch. 11.3.
106 See Prateek Agarwal, Natural Monopolies, INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST (Apr. 27,
2019), https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/natural-monopolies/ [https://
perma.cc/2BHE-RMN5].
107 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 85, at ch. 9.3.
108 See FLORENCIA JAUREGUIBERRY, AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC PRICE SETTING IN
RETAIL GASOLINE MARKETS 24, 33 (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD269.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EV3J-M36F]; see also James Alm et al., Perfect Competition, Urbanization, and Tax
Incidence in the Retail Gasoline Market, 47 ECON. INQUIRY 118, 121 (2009).
109 See JAUREGUIBERRY, supra note 108, at 32.
110 See, e.g., Price-Taker, INVESTOPEDIA, https://investopedia.com/terms/p/
pricetaker.asp [https://perma.cc/P6PC-RXZQ] (last updated July 10, 2019).
208 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
petitive market in which gas stations on opposite corners of the
same street almost invariably advertise identical prices on a
given day.111
The first-coming monopolist producer of water, carbon diox-
ide, oxygen, and rocket propellant on Mars, however, would not
have competitors that potential customers could turn to if the
monopolist decides to increase its prices for any reason whatso-
ever. It is hard to comprehend why the first company to estab-
lish resource production on Mars would act in a nefarious
manner. The next subsection explores that possibility and con-
cludes that allowing a monopoly to develop in the resource pro-
duction industry on Mars could be disastrous from a policy
perspective.
2. A Monopoly Resource Producer on Mars Could Effectively Control
Access to the Planet
Policy justifications mediate against allowing a monopoly sup-
plier of natural resources to develop and persist on Mars. This
subsection explores how the property right in space resources
established under the SPACE Act could lead to the first resource
producer on Mars controlling access to the planet.
If the firstcomer develops resource gathering on Mars and no
second comers establish a competitive position, a single entity
could effectively exclude others, including sovereign nations or
coalitions thereof, from accessing Mars by cutting off their sup-
ply of these vital resources on which their mission architectures
will likely rely.112 If a mission to Mars relies on the purchase of
water, carbon dioxide, oxygen, or rocket propellant from the
monopolist and the monopolist refuses to meet the mission’s
needs, the group would have no alternative supply sources. In
that case, the group might not be able to make it back to Earth
safely.
Additionally, in a worst-case scenario, the firstcomer’s Martian
settlement could begin to exist as a self-sustaining society
outside the reach of Earth-based regulation and influence.
Under the current international model of national noninterven-
tion in space, there would be no basis for a sovereign govern-
ment to enforce any type of legal judgment against a private
111 See JAUREGUIBERRY, supra note 108, at 32.
112 See Larson, supra note 81.
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entity in outer space.113 And even if there were legal grounds to
enforce such a judgment, the risks associated with fostering any
form of conflict between entities established on separate planets
could lead to Mars falling outside of Earth-bound influence alto-
gether. This is the harm that an amendment to the SPACE Act’s
property right needs to address.
Finally, the ideals underlying human space exploration—fos-
tering technological progress, promoting human cooperation,
and protecting ourselves from the many threats to our prosper-
ity as a species—would be seriously harmed if the result warned
against in this Article were to occur. The hope for the future
and sense of pride that would flourish due to the successful es-
tablishment of a Mars settlement could be irreparably harmed if
the entity that settles Mars handles its newfound position of
power irresponsibly. Such a result could set the continuing de-
velopment of space exploration so far back that the industry
might never recover.
While the hypothetical motives that would cause the
firstcomer to act in a nefarious manner seem out of line with the
ideals of the people at the helm of the private companies cur-
rently planning missions of this type, it is impossible to predict
who will be leading the company that is the first to establish re-
source production on Mars and what their or their successor’s
unspoken interests may be. A more fully developed regulatory
model is needed to balance the competing interests at play—the
need to create incentives for entities to settle distant planets
while still protecting the right of all humans to enjoy in the ben-
efits of the endeavor. The SPACE Act’s property rule perhaps
overzealously supports the former interest while not adequately
protecting the latter.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPERTY RULE WOULD
PREVENT A SINGLE ENTITY FROM CONTROLLING
ACCESS TO THE PLANET WHILE STILL INCENTIVIZING
INVESTMENT IN THE MARTIAN NATURAL
RESOURCE INDUSTRY
To this point, this Article has illustrated the possible negative
consequences of allowing the production of natural resources
on Mars to be determined by granting a property right similar to
that under the SPACE Act. In its place, a method of regulating
113 See Vidya Sagar Reddy, Commercial Space Mining: Economic and Legal Implica-
tions 16 (Observer Research Found., Occasional Paper No. 122, 2017).
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resource production and distribution on Mars should limit the
likelihood of these potential negative effects while adequately
rewarding the pioneering firstcomer to Mars with a significant
return on their investment for being the first entity to establish
resource production on another planet.
This part proposes three methods for determining ownership
of resources on large celestial bodies: (1) a licensing regime for
resource production on Mars that would be granted by a coali-
tion of sovereign governments under an international treaty; (2)
price regulation for the sale of resources by the first producer
that has established a natural monopoly-like advantage on Mars,
which would, to a certain degree, resemble the rate-making pro-
cess for vertically integrated electricity providers in the United
States; and (3) the Martian Riparian Rights Rule, under which
existing producers of Martian resources would not have the
right to extract more than necessary for their own use or for sale
to current or foreseeable future consumers. The goal for an
amendment to the SPACE Act’s property rule is to preserve sec-
ond comers’ opportunities to compete with the firstcomer,
thereby preventing the first-moving monopolist from effectively
controlling access to the planet through its provision of water,
oxygen, and rocket propellant to all second comers.
While this part ultimately concludes that the Martian Riparian
Rights Rule is the best option among the three discussed to
achieve this purpose, it should be noted that this is not necessa-
rily the optimal system for balancing the policy need to avoid a
single entity controlling access to Mars with the need to create
the economic incentives to achieve the goal of settling Mars in
the first place. Rather, this part is intended to show how various
alternative methods of regulation could be weighed and what
their potential drawbacks are while also suggesting a potential
starting point for amending the property rule found in the
SPACE Act.
A. CENTRALIZED LICENSING REGIME
While the rule of capture is the legal standard governing oil
and gas production in the United States, the vast majority of
sovereign nations grant licenses for conducting oil and gas ex-
ploration and production activities to public, private, and pub-
lic-private oil and gas companies or joint ventures (similar sets
of rights are called “concessions”).114 A standard license grants
114 See, e.g., Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 79, at 14, 19–20.
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“the exclusive rights to explore, search, and drill for, produce,
store, transport, and sell” the resource in question within the
designated licensed area for a specific period of time.115 In simi-
lar arrangements, in return for granting a temporary right to
use government-owned land for oil and gas production, the gov-
ernment typically demands a flat fee or a share of revenues,
profits, or recovered resources.116 While there is wide variation
in the forms these arrangements can take, in general, compet-
ing producers submit their project proposals and fee or profit-
sharing offers in “bidding rounds,” and an agency of the na-
tional government approves a proposed plan to search for and
produce oil or gas beneath a certain area of land that is owned
by the government.117 The land is then leased to the energy
company that submits the best bid.118 Most governments operat-
ing under these models retain ownership of the oil and gas that
remains in the ground—title only passes to the producing com-
pany once the resources have been removed from the ground, if
title passes at all.119
A system for licensing the right to gather water and carbon
dioxide on Mars would have to be administered by an interna-
tional coalition made up of either all nations or all space-faring
nations, likely under the authority of an original treaty princi-
pally fashioned by the space-faring nations.120 Similar to the bid-
ding rounds used by most countries for oil and gas licenses on
Earth, nations or private companies wishing to collect resources
such as water and carbon dioxide on Mars would submit propos-
als, which would include justifications for the amount of re-
sources they intend to gather, and the international coalition
would approve the proposals. There would be no need for any-
thing resembling consideration—such as profit or production
sharing arrangements—to flow to the international coalition in
return for granting a license.
Rather than serving a revenue-generating function for partici-
pating national governments, centralized licensing is meant to
allow all affected countries, which could include all nations, to
participate in determining the current use of resources on Mars,
115 Id. at 36.
116 See id. at 40.
117 See Ernest E. Smith, From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 TULSA L.J. 493,
503–04 (1992).
118 See id. at 503–05.
119 See id. at 515.
120 See Larson, supra note 81.
212 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
since the current use of resources affects the future use for all
other humans.121 This approach would better align with the in-
ternational obligations underlying the Outer Space Treaty.122
Furthermore, eliminating the production-incentivizing property
rule of the SPACE Act and replacing it with a model under
which the right to collect resources on Mars would be deter-
mined by representatives of all or most nations would prevent
the monopolistic outcome discussed above.
While centralized licensing would alleviate some concerns
about a Martian monopolist, it is not without its drawbacks. If
licensees are free to sell resources gathered on Mars to second
comers, a licensing regime would do little to resolve the issues
presented by a natural monopoly, where the firstcomer estab-
lishes gathering and conversion infrastructure before anyone
else does, since economies of scale allow it to sell resources to
second comers at the replacement cost of competing for pro-
duction.123 Alternatively, if licensees are restricted from selling
their resources to other groups of Martian settlers, any entity
that wishes to gather resources on Mars would have to produce
water and carbon dioxide for itself. This would be an inefficient
result because it would be better for potential settlers with inter-
ests other than resource production to focus on whatever they
are trying to specialize in.124
Most importantly, a licensing regime would not adequately in-
centivize private investment in the mission to settle and establish
resource production on Mars in the first place as strongly as
would the creation of a general property right.125 This is because
private industry is reticent to rush into areas where governmen-
tal entities have direct control over the profitability of the en-
deavor and ultimate ownership of critical resources.126
121 See Craig Foster, Excuse Me, You’re Mining My Asteroid: Space Property Rights
and the U.S. Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, 2016 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 407, 429 (2016).
122 See Blount & Robison, supra note 11, at 181–83; Myers, supra note 11, at 127.
See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
arts. I, III, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
123 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 85, at ch. 9.1.
124 See id. at ch. 33.1.
125 See Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier: Applying Principles of the
General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentivize Asteroid Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121,
138–39 (2013).
126 See, e.g., William Aldred, Outdated Policy Is Stifling Space Tech Advancement,
COMET LABS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://blog.cometlabs.io/outdated-policy-is-stifling-
space-tech-advancement-2cd29a9abe79 [https://perma.cc/Q7RL-SG2Q].
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A strong anecdotal argument against a centralized licensing
regime is found in the success of the American oil and gas in-
dustry, operating under the rule of capture, as opposed to inter-
national countries that almost universally employ centralized
licensing.127 The tepid development of private oil and gas com-
panies in countries other than the United States demonstrates
how the absence of a strong investment-incentivizing property
right seriously hinders the success of the industry.
B. PRICE REGULATION FOR SALES OF RESOURCES ON MARS
A second option to counter the negative effects of allowing a
monopolist to produce resources on Mars would be to concede
the development and continuance of a natural monopoly in the
industry while attempting to limit its harmful effects by institut-
ing price regulation. This method is applied in many industries,
but its presence is most familiar in the sale of electricity to con-
sumers by vertically-integrated energy companies.128
Regulating the price the firstcomer is allowed to charge for its
production would involve a central authority determining a
price that allows the firstcomer to recoup the costs of its invest-
ment in infrastructure and ensure an adequate return on invest-
ment while allowing the purchaser of resources to pay less than
they would pay under unregulated monopoly pricing. This sys-
tem could even feature an obligation to provide service like that
common to the electric utility industry in the United States.129
The central authority would have to enforce producers’ compli-
ance with the price directive.130
While price regulation would lower the cost to second comers
of establishing a permanent settlement on Mars, it would do lit-
tle to address the policy concerns behind allowing a single entity
to control access to all critical resources on Mars. Regulating the
price charged by natural monopolies can be thought of as a re-
distribution of wealth from the natural monopolist to its custom-
ers, which results in a better economic outcome for the
customer than would exist in an unregulated monopoly mar-
ket.131 Additionally, if the monopoly decides to ignore its obliga-
tion to sell its production to customers, the central authority’s
127 See Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 79, at 33–34.
128 See, e.g., JIM LAZAR, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 5 (2d ed.
2016).
129 See id. at 195.
130 See id. at 130.
131 See generally TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 85, at ch. 11.3.
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ability to enforce any penalties would be tenuous at best, as dis-
cussed in subpart IV(B)(2).
Furthermore, as discussed in the preceding section, in a cen-
tralized licensing regime, investors are weary of government in-
volvement because the level of government involvement often
changes with the people in government and usually leaves less
flexibility for commercial realities to prevail. Since a massive up-
front investment will be required for the monopolist to succeed
in the first place, investors prefer a regulatory regime that leaves
as much control in the hands of businesses as possible. Instead
of attempting to regulate prices in advance and punishing non-
compliance, a method of regulation under which entities are
freer to structure their interactions, with the potential for judi-
cial interpretation on the back end, tends to promote flexibility
and allow for reasoned judgments after actual situations have
played out.
C. THE MARTIAN RIPARIAN RIGHTS RULE
Riparian rights in America are traced to Justice Story’s opin-
ion in Tyler v. Wilkinson.132 Tyler involved an industrial era con-
flict between rival mill owners over the flow of a stream.133 Due
to a trench and dam being dug further upriver, mill owners
downriver sued the owners of the trench and dam because they
suffered a lower flow of water as a result of the construction.134
Justice Story decided that all landowners along a shared body of
water have equal rights to use the water of the river and that “no
one has a right to diminish the quantity which will . . . flow to a
proprietor below, or to throw it back upon a proprietor
above.”135 Justice Story limited the impact of this riparian right
by stating that reasonable use is allowed, judged by the extent of
injury to landowners affected by that use.136
California, a state plagued by constant water-use issues, takes
Justice Story’s position a step further by placing value on the
ultimate beneficial use of water. The California Constitution
states that “the general welfare requires that the water resources
of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which
they are capable . . . the conservation of such waters is to be
132 See 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
133 Id. at 473.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 474.
136 Id.
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exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof . . . .”137 California thus promotes the optimal use of
water over more traditional considerations, such as who was the
first to establish a particular use, thereby molding community
expectations regarding allocation of the resource.
A similar riparian rights model on Mars (a Martian Riparian
Rights Rule) would borrow from and build upon the versions
implemented in the United States. This qualification to the
SPACE Act’s rule of prior appropriation would allow any re-
source producer on Mars to take possession and ownership of
the resources it reasonably needs for its own use and could
foreseeably sell to other settlers, as long as its activities do not
harm the ability of future settlers to provide these resources for
themselves.138 Other settlers would be subject to the same rule
vis-a´-vis the firstcomer and all subsequent comers. Producers
would never have the opportunity to gain ownership of re-
sources that would not be reasonably used or sold in the foresee-
able future.
The reasonableness of the amount of resources gathered
would depend on the producer’s own needs and the needs of
other current settlers for water, carbon dioxide, rocket propel-
lant, and other derivatives of these compounds. The amount
needed for reasonable operations is thus fairly determinable,
since the settlers’ life support, industrial, and launch system
needs can be objectively assessed.
Whether an entity is storing resources for foreseeable future
sale would depend on whether there are known plans for other
entities to attempt to settle Mars and whether their likely re-
source needs would be known. If no one has reasonably certain
plans to follow the firstcomer to Mars or if the second comer
plans on competing with the firstcomer by producing resources
of its own, the firstcomer has no reason to store any more of
these resources than is reasonably required for its own use. How-
ever, if there are other missions that plan on purchasing re-
sources already produced on Mars, the firstcomer could store an
additional amount that would be sold to these entities.139
This standard for resource allocation on Mars and other large
celestial bodies would prevent the first resource producer from
building up an inventory that would allow it to indefinitely price
137 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
138 See Larson, supra note 81.
139 See id.
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a second producer out of the market.140 Instead, the second
comer that wished to compete would have a chance of con-
structing the necessary infrastructure for the production and
sale of resources to potential third and fourth comers, since the
firstcomer could not develop an inventory that would make it
impossible for the second comer to compete economically.
Since previously established producers would still have the right
to store resources for sale to existing and foreseeable future set-
tlers, producers of Martian resources would still be able to earn
a significant return on their investment by establishing this capa-
bility. Although it would no longer be a full monopoly return,
these first producers could likely form an oligopoly that would
earn profits somewhere between that of a monopoly and per-
fectly competitive market.
D. THE MARTIAN RIPARIAN RIGHTS RULE WOULD BEST
PROMOTE COMPETITION FOR RESOURCE PRODUCTION ON MARS
WITHOUT DEPRIVING THE FIRSTCOMER TO THE INDUSTRY OF THE
PROFIT FROM ITS INVESTMENT
The Martian Riparian Rights Rule discussed above represents
the best approach that balances the interests of the firstcomer to
Mars, future entities that settle Mars, and humanity in general.
First, the Martian Riparian Rights Rule would lessen the mo-
nopoly concerns presented by the SPACE Act’s property rule as
applied to water and carbon dioxide on Mars. Most importantly,
the firstcomer would be limited to taking ownership of only the
amount of resources needed for its own reasonable current and
future consumption, sale to current settlers, and sale to foresee-
able future settlers.141 Since the firstcomer could not stockpile
an unnecessary supply of water and carbon dioxide before
others arrive on Mars, the latecomers would have an incentive to
compete with the firstcomer to produce these resources in or-
der to establish themselves as one of the few producers in the
maturing industry. This would result in an oligopoly, under
which lower prices would be charged to future settlers who do
not wish to compete with the resource producers than would be
charged under a monopoly market.142 The market would be
more competitive, and the incentives created by the rules for
140 See Meyers, supra note 95, at 198–99.
141 See id. at 201.
142 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 85, at ch. 10.2.
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property distribution on Mars would better align with the pur-
pose of the SPACE Act.
Second, the firstcomer and other future settlers could never
effectively gain title to all of the resources on Mars by obtaining
far more resources than they need for reasonable current and
future consumption. The Martian Riparian Rights Rule, while
still allowing the firstcomer to collect ample resources for its
own use and for sale to foreseeable purchasers, ensures that the
firstcomer’s use of these freely available resources does not un-
necessarily detract from the productive use of these resources by
other settlers. This preference for avoiding uses of common re-
sources in ways that harm others traces back to the Lockean
maxim, “[f]or he that leaves as much as another can make use
of, does as good as take nothing at all.”143 The Martian Riparian
Rights Rule promotes this utilitarian view of property,144 and
when the rule’s utilitarian focus is combined with allowing more
room for multiple competing producers on Mars than the
SPACE Act’s property rule, the policy concerns about allowing a
single entity to control production and distribution of critical
resources on (and thereby effective access to) Mars would be
meaningfully reduced.
Third, the Martian Riparian Rights Rule would provide a flexi-
ble standard for courts presided over by mere Earthlings to ad-
dress future conflicts over Martian resources. The alternatives
suggested in this Article (centralized licensing or price regula-
tion) would involve ex ante assessments of the most valuable or
least harmful approach from a set of competing options. The
flexibility of the Martian Riparian Rights Rule would allow
courts to consider ex post the wider development of Martian
property law as they adjudicate specific controversies and apply
standards for a resource producer’s storage of reasonably neces-
sary reserves of water and carbon dioxide because the amounts
needed for the producer’s own uses and for foreseeable future
inhabitants of Mars would be objectively determinable.
Finally, if the SPACE Act’s property rule were qualified by the
Martian Riparian Rights Rule, the firstcomer and subsequent
producers on Mars would still be able to earn a significant re-
turn on their investment145 that would lie between a monopolis-
tic and perfectly competitive market, likely closer to the
143 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 189 (1689).
144 See Meyers, supra note 95, at 200.
145 See Larson, supra note 81.
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monopoly side of the spectrum between these two extremes.
While the firstcomer would no longer be able to earn a monop-
oly return indefinitely, being the first to succeed on this daring
new frontier would add a significant amount of prestige to the
firstcomer’s reputation that could help drive customers in the
future. This Article has in no way tried to argue that a private
aerospace company that establishes resource production on
Mars does not deserve a significant return on its investment, re-
flecting the inherently drastic risks taken to establish a perma-
nent, self-sustaining settlement on Mars. Rather, the Martian
Riparian Rights Rule is meant to allow the firstcomer to Mars to
receive almost as substantial of a return while ensuring that no
one entity is capable of controlling the rest of humanity’s access
to potentially the most valuable property expansion in human
history.
VI. CONCLUSION
Establishing a permanent human settlement on Mars that has
the capacity to produce its own water, oxygen, energy, and
rocket propellant for journeys back to Earth and elsewhere in
the solar system is an ambitious goal given the monetary, tech-
nological, and psychological barriers that must be overcome to
make such an endeavor a reality. Any viable mission design
needs to leverage the abundant, accessible bodies of water and
carbon dioxide on the surface of Mars to accomplish this goal.
The property rule created by the SPACE Act incentivizes the
first entity to arrive at Mars with the goal of producing natural
resources to stockpile more water and carbon dioxide than nec-
essary for their consumption in order to sell such resources to
subsequent settlers. Such activity will discourage or preclude a
second comer from competing in the production of these re-
sources. If the firstcomer is able to persist as the monopoly pro-
ducer of water and carbon dioxide on Mars, a single entity could
effectively control access to the planet through its unilateral
control over the production and sale of water, oxygen, carbon
dioxide, and multiple combinations of rocket propellant.
In order to limit the negative effects of a potential monopoly,
Congress and the United Nations should not support a simple
prior appropriation-based ownership rule for resources pro-
duced on Mars and other planets or large moons. Rather, these
and other legislative bodies should consider alternative methods
of regulation that increase the likelihood of potential competi-
tors gaining a foothold in this market, which would limit the
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prices charged to future non-producing Martian settlers and
would prevent a single entity from effectively controlling access
to the planet.
The Martian Riparian Rights Rule developed in Part V of this
Article—under which any resource producer on Mars could not
take title to more resources than necessary for current and fu-
ture personal consumption and sale to other settlers—is an
ideal qualification to the SPACE Act’s property rule. This addi-
tion to the SPACE Act would prevent the firstcomer to Mars
from amassing such a substantial supply of water and carbon di-
oxide that a second comer would be discouraged from attempt-
ing to compete due to the firstcomer’s established success and
supply advantage. Since a monopoly would not develop under
this rule, the concerns surrounding a single private entity effec-
tively controlling access to the planet would be meaningfully
tempered.
This qualification, however, would not prevent the mission
from getting off the ground in the first place. The firstcomer
would still benefit from being the first producer of such re-
sources on Mars and would hold a significant experience-based
and reputational advantage in the sale of resources to foresee-
able future settlers. Additionally, this flexible standard could be
shaped by courts to best balance the interests of all parties in-
volved as this promising market develops.
While alternative property rules for appropriating resources
on Mars have benefits and drawbacks, the method of allocating
resources on Mars should not allow a single private entity to
control access to the most valuable celestial body (besides
Earth) in the solar system. Preventing this result would help en-
sure the valuable use of Mars for all humankind as a source of
vast, newly accessible resources and a safe haven from disaster
on Earth.
